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supreme court case, Kaminsky v. Abrams,22 ruled that an order
denying the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, made after
the sixty-day period, would not be void, since the provisions
of CPLR 2219(a) were merely precatory. 23 In arriving at this
result, the court reasoned that, as a matter of general statutory
interpretation, a provision directing action by a public officer within
a stated time, in -the absence of negative words restraining action
thereafter, should be regarded as merely directory, rather than
as a-limitation on the officer's authority.
The court also stated that the plaintiff was estopped from
attacking the order, since one entitled to the relief here sought, i.e.,
the vacating of the order denying plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment and the granting of summary judgment to defendants,
should not await an unfavorable disposition before moving for
such relief.
It has been suggested that a party considering himself
aggrieved by a court's unwarranted delay might, by mandamus,
compel the court to render a decision.2 ' However, such a course
is usually inadvisable since the court might not be favorably inclined
towards the party seeking mandamus. Also, where, as in Kaminsky,
the motion was decided only three days after the expiration of
the sixty-day period, mandamus would be an ineffective and meaningless remedy in preventing such a minor delay.
The general purpose of time provisions, such as those found in
CPLR 2219(a), is to provide system, uniformity, and promptness
in the conduct of public business? 5 Since a party has no effective
control over a court's action, it would be a harsh construction which
would deprive him. of the benefits of an order because of the courts
failure to decide a motion by a particular day.
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CPLR 3101(b): Accident reports made by self-insurer to independent firm of private investigatorsmay be privileged matter.
Holding that accident reports made to a liability insurer were
material prepared for litigation, and therefore immune from disclosure under CPLR 3101(d), the appellate division, first department, in Kandel v. Tocher,26 did not find it "necessary . . to
determine whether reports, investigation, and statements received
22 51
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Misc. 2d 5, 272 N.Y.S.2d 530 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965).

See also Leumi Financial Corp. v. Richter (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), 153

March 29, 1965, p. 15, col. 4.
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See Fallon v. Hattemer, 229 App. Div. 397, 342 N.Y. Supp. 93 (2d
Dep't 1930).
"25 Ibid.
2622 App. Div. 2d 513, 256 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1st Dep't 1965).
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or created by an automobile liability insurer would also involve
the other preclusive provisions of CPLR 3101 [i.e., privileged
27
matter, or attorney's work product] .
In what appears to be an extension of Kandel, the court,
*."..

in Aldrich v. Catel Serv. Co.,28 stated that accident reports made by

a self-insurer to an independent firm of private investigators might,
under the proper circumstances, be entitled to immunity from disclosure under CPLR 3101(b)'s provision for privileged matter 29
In Aldrich, an employee of the self-insured defendant made a
report to an independent corporation which was investigating the
accident he was involved in. In holding that this report should be
disclosed, the court determined: (1) that the report could not
be rendered immune from disclosure as material prepared for
litigation, because that objection had been waived; 30 (2) that the
matter was not attorney's work product because it was not prepared
by an attorney acting as an attorney; 31 and (3) that while the
report might be a privileged communication between attorney and
client, the facts 3adduced
were insufficient to enable the court to so
2
categorize them.

Whether matter sought to be disclosed is immune under CPLR
3101(b) is determined by whether the information would be
privileged at trial (CPLR Article 45); if privileged at trial, then
the material is also immune from 3101 disclosure.3 3 In Aldrich,
the fact that the accident report was given to a party concededly
not acting as an attorney does not compel the conclusion that the
report may not be embraced by the attorney-client privilege. A
communication may fall within this privilege though made to a third
party, if the party is an agent of the attorney 34 or a necessary
agent of the client. 38 This, therefore, tends to substantiate the
court's conclusion that these reports might, under the proper circumstances, be privileged.
27K andel v. Tocher, 22 App. Div. 2d 513, 517, 256 N.Y.S.2d 898, 901 (1st
Dep't 1965).
28 51 Misc. 2d 16, 272 N.Y.S.2d 582 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1966).
29 Aldrich v. Catel Serv. Co., 51 Misc. 2d 16, 19-20, 272 N.Y.S.2d 582,
586 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct 1966).

301d. at 17, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 584.

31Id. at 18, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
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Id. at 20, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
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